The political economy of healthcare litigation : model and empirical application to Uruguay by Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 5821
The Political Economy of Healthcare Litigation
























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5821
The political economy of health care is complex, as 
stakeholders have conflicting preferences over efficiency 
and equity. This paper formally models the preferences 
of consumer and producer groups involved in priority 
setting and judicialization in public health care. It 
uses a unique dataset of stakeholder perceptions, from 
Uruguay, to test whether these hypotheses are consistent 
with empirical evidence. The results suggest that the 
expectations of the political economy literature are 
supported: 1) regulators of public healthcare are less 
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concerned with efficiency considerations than consumers; 
and 2) less organized groups are more concerned about 
equity than more organized interest groups. With respect 
to the consequences of health litigation, the findings are 
only partially consistent with the health care governance 
literature. Consumers perceive litigation as more 
beneficial than health care providers and regulators do. 
Counter-intuitively, powerful interest groups seem less 
willing to use litigation to shape policy outcomes.The Political Economy of Healthcare 
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I.  Introduction 
 
As  in  any  other  public  policy-making  field,  scarcity  of  resources  means  that  the  nature  of  publicly 
financed health care provision is affected by political economy dynamics. These ‘generic’ underlying 
dynamics determine the relative bargaining power of different stakeholders, and therefore, who gets 
what, when and how. Given the (partially) conflicting priorities of different stakeholders, it becomes 
possible  to  anticipate  that  perceptions  of  the  utility  of  the  public  health  care  system  vary  across 
stakeholders in predictable ways. Furthermore, emanating from this general premise, it is possible to 
anticipate the different reactions of stakeholders to institutional change, which alters the attributes of 
the public health care system.  
One major institutional change that has occurred/may occur in many countries is the increased 
use of health care related litigation. The substantive effect of increased health litigation, on the overall 
utility of the public health care system, is controversial and much disputed in the literature. On the one 
hand,  increased  litigation  can  improve  the  protection  of  the  individual  right  to  health,  as  well  as 
generate positive externalities in policy design, implementation and monitoring. Thus, health litigation 
can, potentially, correct inefficiencies in the public health system and ensure that litigant’s rights are not 
ignored. On other hand, the enforceability of the individual right to health care can also have a negative 
impact on health systems by distorting the allocation of resources towards the priorities of those who 
can litigate (not necessarily representatives of the typical patient), as well as adversely affecting the 
fundamentals of priority setting, equity, and the financial sustainability of the benefit plan. What is the 
net effect of litigation? Does it promote/diminish the equity and/or efficiency of public health benefit 
plans?  
This paper aims to contribute to this growing corpus of work by formally developing and testing 
the implications of a model of the political economy of public health resource allocation. Specifically, we 
test:  (1)  whether  the  agendas  of  stakeholders  do  diverge  significantly  along  efficiency  and  equity 
dimensions as the generic political economy literature would anticipate; and (2) given the substantive 
assumptions of the governance literature, how increased health litigation is perceived to affect the 
welfare of different stakeholder groups. These empirical implications, of the model, are tested using 
data collected from key healthcare stakeholders in Uruguay. This research agenda is realized via the first 
section. The next section, Section II, provides a brief literature review- thereby, providing a rationale for 
modeling  and  critically  evaluating,  via  empirical  hypothesis  testing,  the  political  economy  of  public 3 
 
health care and health litigation. Section III develops a simple model of the political economy of health 
care- the aim of the section being to generate a set of hypotheses, whose robustness can be tested. 
Subsequently, Section IV, using a unique dataset of stakeholder perceptions from Uruguay, empirically 
evaluates the veracity of these theoretically derived hypotheses. The final section concludes with a 
critical evaluation of the findings and implications of the previous sections. 
 
II.  Literature Review  
 
Virtually all developed and many developing countries provide some form of publicly financed health 
services to their citizens. Given the scarcity of resources, governments have had to devise mechanisms 
to  determine  the  nature of  health  service  allocation.  The  ensuing  political  economy of  health  care 
allocation  is  thus,  characterized  by  potentially  complex  considerations  of  both:  (1)  efficiency
5-  are 
publicly financed health services efficiently/poorly allocated? and (2) equity
6- what are the implications 
of providing different levels of heath care services to (sub-sets of) the population?  Unsurprisingly, all 
elements of this process are potentially subject to classical principal-agent problems as the interests of 
the agents (health bureaucracies and providers) may deviate from those of their principal (health care 
consumers). The magnitude and nature of any such principal-agent dynamics varies depending on how 
the institutional context conditions the nature of interaction between the two. Specifically, a wide range 
of institutionally induced incentive structures have been developed/used over time, to try and mitigate 
conflicts of interest between public health care providers (agents) and (potentially multiple) consumers 
(principals) (Besley, 2006).
7 One such institutional mechanism that can alter the dynamics of interaction, 
between health care providers and  consumers, is health litigation. That is the use of court rulings to 




                                                           
5 Formally efficiency can be defined as the extent to which input resources, of a health care system, are transformed into 
intended outcomes (consumer demands are satisfied) as opposed to diverted to other activities (the private agenda of health 
care providers). 
6 Formally equity can be defined as equal access to health care goods and services regardless of individual identities, and 
resource endowments. 
7 Besley, T. Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford University Press, USA, 2006. 
8 Gloppen, Siri. "Litigation as a Strategy to Hold Governments Accountable for Implementing the Right to Health." Health and 
Human Rights. 10.2 (2008): 21-36.   4 
 
The  increasing  use  of  judicial  mechanisms  to  alter  the  incentives  of  agents  has  generated 
extensive discussion, regarding the net welfare effects of increased litigation.
9  For its supporters health 
litigation makes the public system more responsive to consumer demands, effectively ensuring that 
patients can access the services they need and minimizing rent extraction
10 by public health providers.  
Academics such as Gloppen and Gargarella (2008) argue that litigation can contribute towards holding 
governments and public health agencies accountable and thus mitigating incentives for negligenc e and 
malpractice.   
 
However, skeptics argue that impact of health litigation is not necessarily positive. Some critics 
argue that judges do not have the duty or technical competence to decide on health related policy 
concerns.
11  Executive agencies are of ten worried of the increasing costs associated with health 
litigation, arguing that increased judicialization threatens the financial sustainability of healthcare 
systems. Others, such as Horowitz (1977) argue that the judicialization of public health care may impact 
and even distort decisions in health planning and priority setting, decisions that might not reflect the 
collective need but rather the individual right that the courts judge upon.
12 According to this argument, 
the health litigation mechanism can create significant adverse equity effects which are often costly.  
This is because the costly nature of health litigation means that, unless all health consumers 
have the same political and/or economic resources, certain groups are more likely to be able to litigate 
effectively vis-à-vis others. This raises the possibility of classical, Olsonian style (1982) opportunities for 
rent-seeking
13  whereby, more organized individuals/groups are able to   determine the allocation of 
resources at the expense of unorganized groups and health care agencies.  In other words, critics argue 
that resource allocation resulting from litigation is not necessarily optimal (if the socially optimum is 
                                                           
9 Gloppen, Siri, et al. “Right to Health through Litigation?”  Rights Democracy and Development. (2008)., Hans Hogerzeil, Hans, 
et al. "Is Access to Essential Medicines as Part of the Fulfillment of the Right to Health Enforceable through the Courts?" The 
Lancet 368.9532 (2006): 305-11. 
10 Rent extraction can be defined as the ability of policy producers to divert resources designed to meet consumers demand for 
publicly financed goods to satisfy their own private agenda. For example, they may steal equipment, be negligent of their 
duties, resort to extortion in order to deliver services etc. 
11 Kersh, Rogan, and James Morone. "Obesity, Courts, and the New Politics of Public Health." Journal of Health Politics, Policy 
and Law 30.5 (2005): 839. 
12 Helmke, Gretchen, and Jeffrey Staton. Courting Conflict: A Logic of Risky Judicial Decisions in Latin America. 2009.,Gloppen, 
Siri, et al. “Right to Health through Litigation?”  Rights Democracy and Development. (2008). 
13 Rent seeking can be defined as the willingness of organized interest groups/individuals to expend resources on lobbying, 
litigating, and/or bribing policy-providers to allocate fixed and finite (public) resources to further their private agendas. For 
example a pharmaceutical company may lobby for the public health care system to use its product as a treatment even though 
this is not the most cost-effective use of scarce resources. 5 
 
conceived as taking the latent preferences of all groups and individuals into account).  Thus, while health 
litigation might  limit  incentives  for  rent-extraction by  the  agency,  it may  create  incentives  for rent 
seeking, as organized groups (e.g. pharmaceutical industries, lawyers) can use litigation to pursue their 
private agenda at the public expense.   
 
  Given the potentially multi-faceted effects of increasing health litigation, it is unsurprising that 
there is a growing body of research that has attempted to determine the net welfare effect of this 
phenomenon.  For instance, Gloppen (2005, 2008) and Yamin (2008) examined the effects of health 
litigation with respect to its implications on equity, access and quality.
14 Gloppen (2008) and Gargarella 
(2008) examined whether litigation shifts resources from one group of patients to another, as well as 
the nature of the claims.
15  Furthermore,  Gloppen (2008)  and  Mæstad (2008)  studied the equity 
implications of health litigation, while others, such as  Hogerzeil (2006), examined the impact on access 
to  health  services  in  Latin  America.
16  Yamin  and  Gloppen  (2010)  also  looked  at  the  financial 
implications, of judicial decisions, on health care policy. Despite this growing corpus of research, the 
controversy over the net effects of health litigation persists.
17  In summary, the literature on the effects 
of health litigation suggests that public health care is dominated by a set of actors with divergent 
preferences over at least two salient issue dimensions. Thereby, rendering it difficu lt to establish, a 
priori, what the effects of changes in the governance of public health care, due to increased litigation, 
are likely to be.              
 
III.  A Simple Model of the Political Economy of Public Health Policy 
 
Given its inherent complexity, modeling the generic political economy of public policy is challenging, 
because: (1) there are multiple issue dimensions (efficiency/rent-extraction and equity/rent-seeking); 
and  (2)  multiple  actors  with  different  preferences  (individual  agents,  organized  and  unorganized 
groups). Fortunately, given the large number of workhorse models of political economy that focused on 
                                                           
14 Gloppen, Siri, et al. “Right to Health through Litigation?”  Rights Democracy and Development. (2008). 
15 Gloppen, Siri, et al. “Right to Health through Litigation?”  Rights Democracy and Development. (2008). 
16 Gloppen, Siri, et al. “Right to Health through Litigation?”  Rights Democracy and Development. (2008)., Hans Hogerzeil, Hans, 
et al. "Is Access to Essential Medicines as Part of the Fulfillment of the Right to Health Enforceable through the Courts?" The 
Lancet 368.9532 (2006): 305-11. 
17 Yamin, Alicia, and Oscar Parra-Vera. "How Do Courts Set Health Policy? The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court." 
PLoS Medicine 6.2 (2009): e1000032. 6 
 
either: (1) principal-agent conflicts of interest
18 (efficiency/rent-extraction), and/or (2) interest group 
politics
19 (equity/rent-seeking); it is possible to combine the insights of the two modeling traditions
20 
into one simple model. This exercise, of formally modeling the political economy of public policy -
making, enables the generation of a rich set of implications, which can: (1) genera te predictions about 
different actors’ interest, preferences and perceptions of the utility of current equilibrium outcomes 
(nature  of  the  public  health  care  system),  and,  consequently,  (2)  in  conjunction  with  substantive 
assumptions regarding the impact of institutional reform on equilibrium outcomes, predict the welfare 
implications and perceived support for different reform proposals (see the next sub-section). Therefore, 
the modeling exercise serves as an essential basis for developing sophisticated and context specific 
hypotheses  regarding  the  perceptions  of  and  the  impact  of  institutional  change  on,  stakeholder 
perceptions of the public health care system. 
The Model
21 
As in Persson (1998, p.311) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.161-163) let us consider a polity in which 
individual  voters    (policy  consumers)  belong  to  different  but  equally  powerful  interest  groups
, and  , each group has a set of members with a cumulative density which equals to 1. 




                                                           
18 The notion that the public sector agencies may have their own private agendas was first developed by members of the 
Virginia School of Political Economy/Public Choice School. With respect to the autonomy of public sector agents the seminal 
contribution is Niskanen (1971). Recent seminal contributions include Shleifer and Vishny (1998). 
19 Bernheim, B.D., and M.D. Whinston. "Exclusive Dealing." National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA, 
1996.; Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. "Technology and Trade." National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass.,  
USA, 1994.;    Coe, D.T., and E. Helpman. " International R&D Spillovers."  European Economic Review  39.5 (1995): 859-87.; 
Persson, T. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics." The Economic Journal 108.447 (1998): 310-27.; and Persson, T., G.E. 
Tabellini, and I. Gasparini. Institute for Econom ic Research. Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What Are the Stylized 
Facts? : Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2001, pp.172-174. 
20 Models of lobbying which incorporate bureaucratic behavior and the political process include Laffont and Tirole  (1993)-
bureaucratic capture- and legislative oversight of the bureaucracy (Horn, 1994). 
21 This model is a close adaptation of Persson (1998) also available in Persson and Tabellini (2000), pp.172-174. Specifically, the 
model developed below incorporates the possibility that the public sector (agent) may have its own independent agenda (rent-
extraction) and does not merely cater to the demands of organized (rent-seeking) and unorganized groups. 
22 Expression (1.01) is almost the same as  Expression 1 in Persson (1998, p.311) 










Where,    denotes the consumption of private goods consumed by a given group’s members,    is the 
average supply of -group specific- but publicly financed goods and ‘H is an increasing and concave 
function       with             ersson and Tabellini      p  6   ,  which  only  benefits  the  individual  
group   members  and which is financed by general taxation (ibid). It is also assumed that individual 
income  within  all  groups  is  equivalent  so  that 
           ersson  998 p             ersson and Tabellini      pp  6    6  .   
A simple, socially optimum efficiency benchmark can be derived by assuming that the vector of group 
specific publicly financed goods ‘ ’ is exclusively financed by a group-specific lump sum taxes (
)’  which  are  used  to  generate  all  publicly  financed  goods  and  rents 




The social optimum in this context is realized, in any given group, when the  marginal benefit, for the 





To  see  the  impact  of  public  sector  autonomy  on  group  welfare  assume  that  lump  sum  taxes  are 
collected by a public agency ( -the government)
25. The lump sum tax collected from each group is 
exactly  equivalent to the revenue  required  to  generate  the  optimal  level  of group  specific  publicly 





  and group specific taxes cannot be redistributed across groups (this 
assumption is relaxed below). However the agency has some discretion over how to use the group 
specific tax. In particular, the agency can: (1) finance the provision of group specific publicly financed 
                                                           
23 Expression (1.01) is identical to expression  2 in Persson (1998, p.12). 
24 Expression (1.02) is identical to expression 7.2 in Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.162) 
25 Conceived here as a unitary entity. In fact modeling the effect of government as the weighted, for policy-discretion, average 









j  y 








goods (lump sum taxes of one group cannot be redistributed to another group); or (2) use tax revenue 
to generate rents for the agency (rent-extraction). The group specific budget constraint is such that 
.  Where  is the proportion of the group’s taxable income which is expropriated as rents 
by the agency,   must hence, satisfy  .The agency’s utility is composed of two distinct 
components: (1) the utility it derives from the use of lump sum taxes to provide publicly financed goods 
and private consumption by all groups (benevolent/congruent component); (2) the use of tax resources 
to generate rents (rent-extracting component): 
 
(1.04) 
Where  is the agency’s marginal propensity, , to be benevolent, that is maximize group utility 
by allocating lump sum taxes so that the average marginal group benefit equals the social cost (1.03). 
Thus, members of group   now consume: 
 
(1.05) 
The  optimal  vector  of  publicly  financed  goods  (given  the  agency’s  private  preferences)  is  now 
determined by the propensity of the agency to pursue a rent-extracting strategy. Thus, the provision of 
group specific goods, (1.03), becomes: 
 
(1.06) 
Differentiating (1.05) with respect to , , has a very intuitive effect on tax allocation as the 
second component in expression (1.05) tends towards zero. Thus, if   equals to one, then the public 
agency is purely benevolent,  , and, therefore, (1.06) equals (1.03). Conversely, 
if   equals to zero the agency is purely rent extracting, , and no publicly financed goods or 
private consumption occur as the first component of (1.05) is now equal to zero. Intuitively, if   
groups are overtaxed, because the tax rate is fixed at   but (1.06)<(1.07) meaning that publicly 
financed goods and private consumption  are undersupplied as the gap between tax revenues and the 
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  J (1)r

resources between the provision of publicly financed goods and rent -extraction given the social cost 
(recall that this is set to unity) is:  
 
(1.07) 
Relaxing the assumption that taxes, from a given group, can only be used to finance: (1) group specific 
goods and/or, (2) agency rents, allows the illustration of how special interest lobbies can alter the 
allocation of resources. Assume that publicly financed goods an d agency rents are now financed by  a 
general lump sum tax on all groups (Persson 1998, p.312).  Given such a universal tax regime, , the 
budget constraint is now  . Thus, the members in any given group   consume the following 





Intuitively, if a given group j was capable of expanding the provision of its specifically desired good, , 
the marginal cost it faced would be the average level of taxation-  - which is in fact less than the real 
marginal    cost-  if    j  is  sufficiently  big  (Persson,  1998,  p.312-313).    If  each  group  can  therefore 
independently push and achieve its optimum level of a  group specific good provision, and given the 
exogenous level of agency rent-extraction, (1.06) becomes: 
 
(1.09) 
Where an equilibrium outcome is equivalent to a vector 
D ( where
 D=decentralized spending), so that  
each lobby group , , maximizes       given     taking both agency rents- - as well as the actions of 
all  other groups as exogenous and given (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p.163). Since the right hand-side 
of (1.09) has a negative value and unless  , in which case no groups but only the agency allocates 










































for all   (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p.163). In particular smaller groups overspending more vis-à-vis 
their larger counterparts as each group only fully takes into account the benefits of its own (group 
specific) publicly financed goods provision but only pays a   fraction of the marginal cost of higher 
taxation and agency rent-extraction for which it is liable. Thus, the concentration of private benefits and 
the diffuse nature of social costs leads to excessive spending when such spending is residually defiance 
out of a common pool of resources (ibid).  
So far the assumption of this model has been that each group or lobby has equal political power. 
However, it may be possible that some groups can organize as a lobby in order to incentivize a more 
favorable allocation of common tax revenue for the provision of their preferred publicly financed goods. 
For simplicity, assume that lobbies cannot alter the generation of agency rents. That is, the agency 
cannot credibly commit to alter its level of rents generated from tax revenue. However, lobbies can 
influence  the  allocation  of  resources,  between  the  provisions  of  different  group  specific  publicly 
financed goods. Therefore, if it is assumed that organized groups (lobbies) are all-inclusive and have the 
sole objective of simply maximize the welfare of their members (Persson, 1998, p.313-314). Then, the 




At the first stage of this policy-making game, each organized interest group, unilaterally (without any 
considerations for what other groups do) and simultaneously, provides the agency with a (potential) 
contribution/transfer    which it can credibly commit to providing, as long as the agency generates 
the groups preferred policy. In line with precedent, limiting the focus to truthful strategies pursued by 
all lobbies/interest groups  (Persson, 1998, p.313)
26 such a strategy must meet the following condition: 
‘ ’ 
(1.11) 
                                                           


























Where   is a constant parameter that is set by the interest group in order to maximize the said group’s 
specific welfare- which is simply, ‘  ’( ersson, 998, p.   ). 
At the second stage of the game the agency sets   so as to maximize the utility of all the actors 
involved given their effective demand/importance to the agency (determined by the agencies taste for 
rent extraction and the ability of lobbies to provide contributions). Specifically that includes: (1) the 
utility  of  unorganized  groups,  and  (2)  lobby  contributions  discounting  for  its    (the  agency’s)  (3) 
(exogenously) determined propensity to rent-extract. That is: 
 
(1.12) 
Where   is the propensity, , of the agency’s conditional benevolence (willingness to allocate 
resources to satisfy unorganized groups after rent-extraction satisfying agency needs has occurred). The 
logic behind the equilibrium outcome is that, the (Pareto) optimal solution is the one that takes into 
account the dynamic between the agency (and its private objective-1.12) and the effective demand of 
organized  lobbies  ‘ ’  (Persson,1998,  p.313).  Thus,  given  these  incentives  the 
optimal policy, as set by the agency, maximizes: 
 
(1.13) 
 Aggregate social welfare for unorganized groups (vs. organized lobbies and government agencies) is 
defined in the same manner as in (1.12) (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p.173). Thus, the extent to which 












































































From (1.14a, 1.14b) it is possible to deduce that a socially optimum equilibrium is possible and would 
emerge if   (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p.174).  This occurs, in the very restricted case, when 
  (the  agency  is  multi-dimensionally  benevolent-  neither  rent-extracting  nor  accepting 
contributions from lobbies). Lobby contributions are non-existent if: (1)   (there are no organized 
lobbies); or (2)   (all income is expropriated by a rent-extracting agency). The impact of lobbies, on 
the allocation of taxation, will also be inconsequential if   (all groups are organized-lobbying for 
the provision of their own preferred publicly financed goods but also the reduction in spending on all 
other publicly financed goods) (Persson, 1998, p.314). Lobby power is maximized when   in 
which case all resources are allocated by the contribution of lobbies. 
Given  the  assumptions  of  the  model,  as  well  as  any  status  quo  institutional  configuration, 
,  the  (institutionally  unconstrained)  bliss  point    of  any  actor  (unorganized  group,  the 
agency, organized groups) will diverge from that of any other actor. As, by assumption, the bliss point of 
a/an:  (1)  unorganized  group  is  realized  when       
                       (efficiency  and  equity 
maximizing); (2) agency is realized when    
              (efficiency minimizing); (3) organized lobby 
is realized when      
                      (efficiency maximizing equity minimizing). As, it cannot 
be the case that, at any one time   and  , then  . Therefore, the 
major (generic) testable implication of the model is that: 
 
Generic  Hypothesis:  Perceptions  of  the  efficiency  and  equity,  of  the  status  quo  public  health  care 
system, will differ systematically across actors (stakeholders).   
Specifically, it is possible to deduce the following specific hypotheses, regarding how different actors will 
perceive the efficiency and equity of the status quo relative to other actors:   
Hypothesis  1:  All  policy  consumers  (lobbies  and  unorganized  groups)  will  value/prioritize  efficiency 























































* j  
*13 
 
Hypothesis  2:  Relatively  unorganized  groups  will  be  more  concerned  about  equity  effects  than 
organized groups  .
27 
 
More pertinently, the implications of the model can be used to predict how different actors will 
perceive changes to the institutional context (welfare implications induced by changes in the efficacy 
and equity outcomes)- therefore, a change in the institutional context from say   to   
will generate predictable reactions from different actors. Generally an institutional change will affect the 
welfare of a given group depending on how its marginal effect alters the efficacy and equity of different 
actors. Specifically:  



































                                                           
27  It is important to note that, according to the logic of classical collective action problems, that more all- encompassing but 
unorganized groups (e.g. civil society, general interest patient groups) will, on average, have a greater latent concern regarding 
the overall equity of the health care system vis-à-vis patient groups with better organization but a more narrow focus (e.g. 
cancer patient lobbies). Thus, in practice, the latter groups are more likely to effectively lobby for equity, even though the 
preferences, as recorded in the stakeholder analysis, of the former groups should exhibit greater concerns for overall equity. 
28 It is easily to establish conditions under which a given actor will be indifferent to or be adversely affected by a reform but this 











The agency will favor an institutional reform if: 

 '   
(1.15c) 
In short, given their distinct ideal preferences, it is  possible to deduce, the conditions under which an 
institutional reform will be perceived to be welfare enhancing from the perspective of different actors 
involved in the political economy of public policy-making. 
Substantive Assumptions: A Case Study of Health Litigation 
It  is  now  possible  to  use  the  generic  implications  of  the  model,  in  conjunction  with  substantive 
arguments, regarding how specific institutional change affects the efficiency and equity attributes of the 
public  health  care  system,  to  generate  a  set  of  secondary,  or  substantive  hypotheses  regarding 
stakeholder perceptions of the welfare effects of institutional change. As noted above (see Literature 
Review),  the  rise  of  health  litigation,  as  a  means  of  altering  the  nature  of  public  health  resource 
allocation  (change  in  incentives 

S(,)  to  ), has generated a debate regarding the 
consequences of this contextual transformation on the incentives faced by the public health care 
providers. As Gloppen (2009), p.24 notes
29: 
‘Litigation  can  contribute  towards  holding  governments  accountable  with  respect  to 
policy gaps and implementation gaps…bringing national health laws and policies in line 
with health rights obligations  …However, this does not mean that litigation is 
the best approach to advance health in a society- nor that it is necessarily contributes 
positively. The criticism voiced against court-centric approaches to health rights and, 
more generally, against health litigation…[is that] poor people are less likely to litigate 
and that the “haves” tend to come out ahead in court  ’ 
 
In short, the generic model developed above can be used, in conjunction with these substantive 
claims emanating from the literature, to operationalize and test a set of hypotheses, regarding the 
multiple consequences of institutional change (more health litigation), on perceptions of stakeholder 
welfare. Essentially, what Gloppen (ibid) is arguing is that increasing the responsiveness of public sector 
                                                           
29 Gloppen, Siri. "Litigation as a Strategy to Hold Governments Accountable for Implementing the Right to Health." Health and 








health agencies to the demands of health consumers may have the effect of: ( ) reducing the agencies’ 
incentives for rent-extraction, but, also by (2) enhancing the ability of some policy-consumers (organized 
groups) to use the courts to effectively alter these agencies more effectively than unorganized groups, 
increasing the magnitude of rent-seeking. Thus, the net effect of health litigation, from the perspective 
of different actors is potentially ambiguous. Specifically, according to this literature and the generic 
implications of the model increased health litigation should be anticipated to be perceived:  
1.  As a negative development by the agency (diminished ability to extract rents),  
2.  Ambiguously by effect on unorganized groups (the net effect will depend on whether the 
welfare gain from a reduction in rent-extraction is greater or smaller than the welfare gain 
from the increased power of lobbies), 
3.  As  a  positive  development  by  consumer  lobby  groups  (who  gain  the  ability  to  more 
effectively pursue a rent seeking agenda), 
  
Of course when seeking to operationalize these substantive claims via the generic model, it is important 
to note that the binary distinction between the different actors may need to take into account the 
complex interaction some groups have with each other. Thus, while there may be a clear distinction 
between public sector agencies and relatively unorganized groups, the incentive alignment of more 
organized groups and the public sector may be more blurred. This is because such organized groups may 
be interacting with public sector agencies in multiple issue dimensions and may therefore, condition 
their perceptions, of the impact of institutional change (such as increased health litigation),to take this 
complexity into account. For example, pharmaceutical companies (organized groups) may be reluctant 
to pursue an aggressive policy of health litigation because it may antagonize their dealings in other issue 
dimensions with public sector agencies. It is therefore, important, when operationalizing the model, to 
ensure that different definitions of actors are used in order to control for the possibility that certain 
organized groups may have complex and multiple interactions with the public sector test the robustness 
of the model’s hypotheses. Therefore, it can be anticipated that broader definitions of actors will yield 
the most robust results as this reduces the possibility that the multi-dimensional considerations of any 
one sub-group will affect the outcomes of the empirical analysis. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
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We tested the empirical implications of our model on a new dataset of stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
efficiency and equity attributes of the public health care system and perceptions of the impact of health 
litigation in Uruguay. Since the early 1990s, there has been an increasing trend in the overall number of 
litigation cases brought to Latin American courts on the basis of constitutionally guaranteed rights to 
health and life. For example, the phenomenon of health litigation took shape around 1995 in Colombia 
(Contreras 2008).
30  The number of litigation cases brought to  the Colombian courts reached a total of 
33,328 in only two years. This example is not singular, as Brazil and Argentina started to follow the 
escalating trend. Given budget constraints, the individual or group claims against governments caused 
distortions in terms of equity, efficiency and financial sustainability of the publicly funded healthcare 
plans. Compared to such regional standards, the number of healthcare litigation cases in Uruguay is 
small. According to a study that includes a selected sample of litigations from 2001 to 2009, there were 
nine (9) cases of judicial proceedings that demanded access to certain medications
31 and five (5) cases 
from 2009 to 2010.
32 According to additional estimates of one of the main executive agencies affected 
by judicialization, the number of cases has been around 20 a year.
33  
  Taking into considerations the relatively small scale of the judicialization phenomenon, as well 
as the lack of issue polarization among key stakeholders, Uruguay offers a compelling and feasible pilot 




In order to solicit perceptions of relevant actors, we followed the main steps and procedures of 
stakeholder analysis.  Stakeholder analysis and mapping are methods widely used in management and 
social sciences to identify the key actors in a policy process, as well as their incentives, power and 
positions within a given policy domain. More specifically, this method has been extensively used in 
                                                           
30 Contreras, Juan. “La tutela como manifestación de algunas fallas del mercado y de gobierno en el sistema general de 
seguridad social en salud de Colombia que comprometen la eficiencia y la equidad del mismo.” Revista de Derecho y Economía. 
25 (2008). 
31 Campos, Santiago Pereira, Rafael García Martínez, et al. Estudios Multidisciplinarios sobre Derecho Medico y Organizaciones 
de la Salud. Uruguay: La Ley Uruguay, 2011.  pg. 285. 
32 Campos, Santiago Pereira, Rafael García Martínez, et al. Estudios Multidisciplinarios sobre Derecho Medico y Organizaciones 
de la Salud. Uruguay: La Ley Uruguay, 2011.  
33 Sartori, Maria  az. “Fondo de Recursos sufre presiones jurídicas importantes” debido a laboratorios que sustentan las 
demandas, dijo experto de la O S” Seminario Búsqueda. June 9, 2011. 17 
 
public health research in order to provide a cross-sectional picture of an evolving political economy of 
actors’ interaction.
34 
Methodologically, stakeholder mapping relies on in-depth interviews with major stakeholders 
(therefore  a  large  s/N  sample  to  population  proportion),  but  it  can  be  used  jointly  with  other 
quantitative or qualitative social science methods. It has also been found useful as a preparatory tool for 
micro-level household surveys and formal modeling.
35 For the analytical purposes of this paper, we do 
not present the complete stakeholder mapping and analysis. Instead, the empirical section uses a 
number of selected survey questions that tap exclusively into general questions of equity and efficiency 
assessments in relation to priority setting and litigation.
 36  
Why not micro-level surveys with larger sample size for analyzing priority setting and health 
litigation? Priority  setting  and  the Constitutionally mandated right to health are ultimately patient-
centric issues, ideally addressed with micro-level data. However, stakeholder mapping and macro-level 
political economy analysis are more useful as initial analytical building blocks for several reasons: 1) the 
issues of health litigation and priority setting have been only recently emerging in developing countries; 
their salience is not yet high enough among the general public, and the pool of claimants is very small 
compared  to  the  general  population;  2)  stakeholder  analysis  and  mapping  analyze  aggregated 
preferences  of  mobilized  groups  as  opposed  to  diffuse  interests  of  citizens,  therefore  being  more 
relevant to short term policy making dynamics; 3) patient focus groups can be a substitute for micro-
level surveys especially as the problem is complex, vaguely specified and would benefit from interaction 
among participants; often, however, stakeholder analyses help identify the policy issue and preferences 





                                                           
34For an extensive methodological review, see:  Ruairí Brugha and  Zsuzsa Varvasovszky. “Stakeholder Analysis: a Review, 
“Health Policy and Planning (2000) 15 (3): 239-246. Examples of stakeholder analyses in the public health research: Blair et al. 
1996; Reich 1994 
35 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/PoliticalEconomy/stakeholderreading.htm; Fadi El-Jardali, Jihad 
Makhoul, Diana Jamal, Michael Kent Ranson, Nabil M Kronfol and Victoria Tchaghchagian. “Eliciting policymakers’ and 
stakeholders’ opinions to help shape health system research priorities in the Middle East and North Africa region.” Health Policy 
and Planning (2010) 25 (1): 15-27. 
36 Zsuzsa Varvasovszky and Ruairí Brugha . “How to Do (or Not to Do)…: A Stakeholder Analysis,” Health Policy Plan. (2000) 15 
(3): 338-345. 18 
 
In order to understand and map stakeholders’ positions on the consequences of judicialization 
of health, we collected two sets of data: first, with the help of a team of local consultants with an 
established national reputation in the fields of law and public health,
37 we identified a representative 
sample of key actors with influence and stakes on   the specific issue of healthcare judicialization 
(representatives  of  several  agencies  within  executive,  legislative  branch,  political  party  leaders, 
members  of  the  judiciary,  pharmaceutical  companies,  patient/consumers  groups,  civil  society 
representatives, doctors’ associations, insurers groups etc.). Subsequently, we conducted around 45 in-
depth  face-to-face  interviews  in  Montevideo  (March-April  2011).  The  qualitative  (semi-structured) 
component of the study allowed us to gather more fine-tuned theoretical insights and take into account 
additional stakeholders indicated to us by our respondents during the semi-structured interviews. 
Second, incorporating these insights, we designed, pre-tested and implemented a quantitative 
stakeholder survey in order to systematically capture differences in evaluation of stakes across groups of 
actors within the policy domain.  To our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to test statistically 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the efficiency and equity of the public benefit plan in general, as well as the 
implications of rising healthcare litigation on these two issue dimensions in particular. 
  The  survey  design  attempts  to  trace  the  entire  process  chain  of  health  judicialization  from 
origins to perceived consequences, and contains three main parts:  art I taps into stakeholders’ general 
perceptions of the current Benefit Plan and priority setting; Part II shifts the focus to the origins of 
litigation and the perceived effectiveness of the judicial process, and Part III analyzes two major types of 
litigation cases (malpractice and access to high technology medication and treatments – recursos de 
amparo)  as well as perceptions of the consequences of judicialization.  
The political economy of healthcare in general has a high level of complexity, and has been 
conventionally characterized as a “fuzzy” domain (Brugha and Varvaszowsky     :  44)
38. Additionally, 
health litigation poses even more research and policy challenges given the fact that its increase is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, judicialization is a highly specific niche of inquiry, and its origins and 
consequences are not fully understood yet. Therefore, in the absence of other empirical studies of 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the origins and effects of judicialization, we aimed for comprehensiveness 
when designing the semi-structured and structured components of the survey.  
                                                           
37 We are grateful to Dr. Santiago Pereira Campos, Dr. Rafael Garcia Martinez and other colleagues who were instrumental for 
the identification of stakeholders, interviews, survey design, pre-tests and implementation.  
38 Ruairí Brugha and  Zsuzsa Varvasovszky. “Stakeholder Analysis: a Review,” Health Policy and Planning (2000) 15 (3): 239-246. 19 
 
The  instrument  contains  a  core  of  37  questions  that  aimed  to  trace  all  the  dimensions  of 
litigation starting with overall perceptions of the Benefit Plan and priority setting strategies employed by 
the government, exploring features of the judicial process, and ending with consequences of litigation. 
The instrument design was inspired by recent methodological recommendations related to the study of 
the political economy of healthcare (Gloppen 2009: 26). We also used additional modules of group 
specific  questions  for  judges,  doctors,  insurers,  pharmaceutical  companies  and  patient  groups.  The 
sections that present the main findings include the concrete formulation of survey questions designed 

























Our quantitative dataset includes 36 observations, with a response rate of around 75%, and 
distributed across groups as follows: 
 
Table 1: Stakeholder groups and samples 
Stakeholder group  Interest group coding  Observations  
Executive (two ministries and one agency)  Government (unified agency)  7 
Legislature  Government (unified agency)  6 20 
 
 
Despite having a relatively small sample size (s), given that we work with stakeholders’ (as 
opposed to general) population (N), the sample is representative as s/N is medium to high. With help 
from a team of local consultants with strong expertise and ties in both judicial and public health policy 
domains, we aimed to select the majority of relevant stakeholders. The relatively small population size 
in Uruguay made it more feasible for the research team to build a quasi-complete list of stakeholders. 
This task would have been significantly more daunting in larger countries.   
For the quantitative component, we also fine-tuned the sample, by including additional actors 
nominated  during  the  qualitative  interviews.  Moreover,  healthcare  litigation  is  a  recent  issue  of 
relatively low salience even among very informed public health respondents in Uruguay. This aspect 
significantly reduces the pool of stakeholders who would be knowledgeable about its scope and effects. 
It also has a technical nature that renders its relevance low among many constituencies or organizations 
that are not directly affected by it. Therefore, we believe that our sample of respondents accurately 
                                                           
39 For both the judiciary and pharmaceutical companies, our survey sample is quite small compared to the entire population 
(over 400 judges and over 80 pharmaceutical companies and laboratories active in Uruguay). Given that our survey attempted 
to tap into the perceptions of key stakeholders, the team, relying heavily on our local consultants, did its best to select some 
the most influential stakeholders in the judiciary, as well as to maximize variation of views on the issue of healthcare litigation. 
The same applies to the selection of respondents from the private sector. Despite feasibility issues that limited sampling 
involve, we managed to gauge perceptions of a mix of representatives from both foreign and domestic companies. Whereas 
our limitations in sampling does not allow us to statistically generalize results for the distinct populations of individual judges 
and pharmaceutical companies, the responses of key/influential representatives of both groups, as well as maximization of 
variation of views give us confidence in terms of their representativeness within the general population of key stakeholders. For 
the other groups and agencies represented in the survey, the respondents are either the heads or other high decision level 
within their organization, and the organizations are major national actors; the phrasing of the survey questions allowed us to 
distinguish between individual perceptions of our respondents, on one hand, and evaluations of organizational positions and 
incentives given the leading role the individual respondent played in their groups or organizations.  
 
Judiciary
39  Government (unified agency)  4 
Patient groups  Consumers’ groups (organized)  6 
Pharmaceutical companies
40  Producer groups (organized)  3 
Doctors’ groups  Producer groups (organized)  2 
Insurance companies  Producer groups (organized)  3 
Lawyers’ groups   roducers’ groups (organized)  1 
Media  Civil 
society/consumers(unorganized) 
3 




captures the views and assessments of a majority of actors with direct stakes in priority setting and 
judicialization of health.   
In order to generate our empirical results, we perform standard statistical techniques (rank sum 
tests of means, ordered probit regressions, etc.). Whenever the statistical technique is sensitive to the 
small sample size (i.e. maximum likelihood estimation), we also used alternative tests (ANOVA and 
bootstrap quintile regressions and Bayesian techniques) for robustness check.  
  A) Empirical findings for the generic implications of the formal model 
 
To  briefly  recap  the  formally  generated  hypotheses,  we  expect  that  for  a  given  institutional 
configuration , there will be significant divergence among the bliss points of various stakeholders 
according  to  their  preferences  on  two  dimensions  (efficency  and  equity):  a)  healthcare  producer, 
consumer or regulator; and b) the organized or unorganized nature of the lobbying group.  
 
  Hypothesis 1 implies that all healthcare policy consumers care about efficiency to a greater 
extent than the unified public sector agency.
41 Hypothesis 2 suggests that there should be systematic 
differences among  unorganized groups and organized lobbies on the perceived  efficiency and equity 
issues.  
  If  our  theoretical  assumptions  are  correct,  we  should  be  able  to  observe  stakeholder 
heterogeneity of perceptions in terms of their general evaluations of the efficiency and equity of the 
current Benefit Plan and priority setting strategies designed by the Government.   
Our measures of efficiency and equity of benefit plans result from question 4 of the general 
survey, phrased as: “What is the perception of your organization in terms of: a) the quality of the Benefit 
Plan; b) The efficient distribution of resources within the Benefit Plan; c) The accountability of health 
care providers to patients; d) The capacity of the Benefit Plan to provide similar service quality and 
attention to both marginalized and non-marginalized groups; e) The capacity of the average patient to 
have access to prioritized healthcare services (…).” 
The table below summarizes the main findings: 
                                                           
41 Here, the unified public sector agency includes the three branches of government: the executive, legislative and the judiciary. 
Another version of this model and empirical testing will explore divergences in the bliss points of stakeholders representing 




Table 2: Differences of means among groups of stakeholders on the efficiency/equity dimensions  
(T-tests) 































































of the benefit plan 
-1.162***  0.365  1.204***  -0.896**  0.167  -1.037***  1.162*** 
  (-4.78)  (0.99)  (3.40)  (-2.51)  (0.30)  (-2.79)  (4.78) 
               
Efficiency  -0.954***  0.370  0.923**  -1.030*** -0.250  -0.269  0.954*** 
  (-3.77)  (1.07)  (2.41)  (-3.26)  (-0.48)  (-0.65)  (3.77) 
               
Accountability of 
health care 
providers to patients 
-0.346  0.141  0.423  -0.593  0.393  -0.180  0.346 
  (-1.22)  (0.43)  (1.09)  (-1.69)  (0.81)  (-0.49)  (1.22) 
               
Access of 
marginalized groups 
(equity)  -0.855***  0.0833  1.00**  -1.051*** 0.161  -0.436  0.855*** 
  (-3.03)  (0.22)  (2.70)  (-2.88)  (0.29)  (-1.08)  (3.03) 
               
Access of average 
patient (equity)  -0.733**  -0.102  0.923*  -0.875*  0.704  -0.667  0.733** 
  (-2.16)  (-0.25)  (1.81)  (-2.04)  (1.18)  (-1.51)  (2.16) 
               
N 
33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
t statistics in parentheses; p* 0.10 ** 0.05*** 0.01 
Note: Two-sample Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank-sum test results for ordinal variables hold  
 
The table presents simple differences of means among groups of stakeholders according to 
perceptions of five main characteristics of the Benefit Plan (among which  efficiency and  equity are 23 
 
prominent features). As the test operates with the null hypothesis H0: mean (group 0) – mean (group 1) 
=0, a negative sign (and statistically significant coefficient) should be interpreted as a significantly more 
positive evaluation given by group 1 on dimension x, than stakeholders who do not belong to group 1. 
More  concretely,  one  should  read  the  evaluation  of  the  overall  quality  of  the  Benefit  Plan  by 
government as being significantly more favorable than everybody else who is not a member of the 
executive, the legislature or the judiciary. In contrast, a positive and significant difference means that 
the main tested group has a less favorable assessment of dimension x. We can see, for example, that 
civil  society  members,  overall,  assess  the  Benefit  Plan  and  priority  setting  strategies  designed  and 
implemented  by  the  public  sector  less  favorably  than  government  stakeholders  on  four  different 
dimensions  (overall  quality,  efficiency  and  two  different  measures  of  equity).  The  results  clearly 
illustrate a sharp division of perceptions mainly between the representatives of the unified public sector 
agency (particularly the executive and the legislative branches), on one hand, and patient and civil 




The histogram below plots the distribution of efficiency assessments across two major groups (unified 
government agencies – 1, and civil society – 0).  
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Efficiency perceptions across groups (public sector versus civil society)
Graphs by gov
Likert scale:  Very inefficient    Inefficient    Satisfactory    Efficient     Very efficient 
Values:                     1                   2                     3                  4                  5 
 
 
   24 
 
 
The  Likert  scale  (with  values  between  1  and  5)  asked  survey  respondents  to  evaluate  the 
“efficient distribution of resources within the Benefit  lan.”  Lower values ( , 2) refer to categories Very 
inefficient  and  Inefficient,  higher  values  (4,  5)  to  Efficient  and  Very  efficient.  As  illustrated  by  the 
histogram, members of government branches are significantly more likely than members of civil society 
groups to assess the Benefit Plan in Uruguay as being efficient.  
  If we treat stakeholders’ assessments of efficiency and equity as being proxies for group bliss 
points, the empirical analysis confirms Hypothesis 1 derived from the model: the public sector agency 
overall is satisfied with the efficiency status-quo, whereas patient groups and unorganized civil society 
groups are less (or not) satisfied.    
   25 
 
Table 3: Efficiency bliss points with controls (ordered probit estimation)
43 
  (Model 1)  (Model 2) 
  Efficiency assessments Efficiency assessments 
     
Government stakeholder 
1.390***  1.217** 
  (2.67)  (2.17) 
Formal participation in 
consultations on the Benefit Plan  -0.933*   
  (-1.89)   
Knowledge of formal consultations 
for Benefit Plan changes    -0.985* 
    (-1.84) 
     
_cut1 
-3.124***  -3.102*** 
  (-2.97)  (-2.73) 
_cut2  -1.403  -1.634 
  (-1.49)  (-1.58) 
_cut3  0.404  0.317 
  (0.43)  (0.32) 
_cut4  1.588  1.493 
  (1.59)  (1.42) 
N  28  25 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10;** p<0.05;*** p<0.01 
 
 
                                                           
43  Given  that  the  dependent  variable  is  ordinal  (measured  from  1  to  5  on  a  Likert  scale),  we  used  maximum  likelihood 
estimation while being aware that the analytical shortcomings of  ordered probit are the result of  the small  sample size.  
Conventional bootstrap OLS results also hold.  26 
 
One of the criticisms that could be raised against deriving policy ideal points from subjective 
efficiency  assessments  stems  from  the  existence  of  information  asymmetries.  If  some  actors  (say, 
government  members)  are  overall  better  informed  about  the  objective  allocation  of  resources  for 
priority  setting  than  civil  society  representatives,  then  the  subjective  evaluations  of  the  status  quo 
(presented in Table 2) might capture the extent of such asymmetries and not necessarily bliss points. 
Table 3 above seeks to control for the extent of information asymmetries between government and 
non-state  stakeholders,  by  including  two  independent  variables  that  measure  the  knowledge  of 
participants about formal consultation processes related to changes in the Benefit Plan, as well as their 
own participation in such platforms. We derived the quantitative measures for these controls from 
question 8 of the survey phrased as follows: “According to the opinion/knowledge of your organization: 
a) is there a process of formal consultation when changing/adjusting PIAS and FTM?
44 (…) c) If there is a 
formal  consultation  process  (during  the  stage  of  adjustments  made  to  the  Benefit  Plan),  has  your 
organization participated?” The response options are Yes (coded as   in the database) and No (coded as 
0). 
We see that even controlling for these two variables, being a member of government (as the 
unified public sector agency) still has a significant and large impact on the evaluation of  efficiency, 
confirming the hypothesis that all policy consumers (both organized lobbies and unorganized groups) 
will value/prioritize efficiency more than the agency  .  
Equity 
The equity dimension shares similarities with the efficiency evaluations. Members of patients’ groups 
and non-state actors are more likely than government representatives to negatively assess the equity 









                                                           
44 PIAS is Plan Integral de Atencion a la Salud; FTM: Formulario Tecnico de Medicamentos. 
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Hypothesis 2 of the model predicted that unorganized groups are more concerned about equity 
effects than organized groups . If this is empirically correct, then lobbying healthcare 
producer  groups  (such  as  pharmaceutical  companies,  doctors  groups,  insurers)  should  have  less 
divergence from the government’s assessments of equity compared to patient/consumers groups. 
  The two histograms below show the distribution of respondents representing organized lobbies 
on the equity dimension.  
Figure 3: Organized lobbies’ comparative assessments of the efficiency and equity of the Benefit Plan 
and priority setting strategies 
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As  Figure     shows,  the mean  perception of  producers’  evaluations  of equity  is  significantly 
higher than the mean for efficiency. In other words, lobbying groups’ ideal points on equity ( . 7) and 
the government’s ideal points diverge less than on efficiency (a mean of  .5 for organized groups’ 
perceptions). The difference of means is statistically significant. Analytically, this means that even if 
producer/organized  groups  are  not more or  less  likely  than  unorganized  groups  to  perceive  equity 
effects (see Table 2 for the lack of statistical significance), they are still more likely to be critical and 
observant of efficiency implications. Whereas roughly agreeing with the government evaluations of 
equity of access, they give a significantly lower score on the efficiency of resource allocation than the 
members of the executive.  
Interestingly enough, for unorganized (or less organized) groups such as civil society (including 
patient groups), equity concerns are statistically less salient than efficiency (a mean of 2.92 for equity 
compared  to  2.35  for  efficiency)  (see  below).  For  patient  groups,  the  means  are  almost 
indistinguishable, with a small (insignificant) higher salience values for equity. However, as Table 2 
indicates, unorganized groups diverge on both equity and efficiency evaluations from the government 
perceptions.  
 
Figure 4: Unorganized lobbies’ comparative assessments of the efficiency and  
         equity of the Benefit Plan and priority setting strategies 
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B)  Empirical findings for the specific implications of the formal model – consequences of healthcare 
litigation 
 
Now, from the Benefit Plan and priority setting strategies, we move to an analysis of the perceived 
effects  of  healthcare  litigation  in  Uruguay.  Our  respondents  were  asked  to  evaluate  two  types  of 
litigation cases: a) recursos de amparo (for the incorporation of new medicine and high cost technology 
in the Benefit Plan); and b) malpractice cases directed against individual doctors or healthcare providers.  
Question   8  of  the  survey  asks  respondents  “what  are  the  consequences  of  healthcare 
litigation?”  and  offers  seven  judgments.  Two  options  are  particularly  relevant  to  our  analysis:  “d) 
Litigation decreases the incentives of inefficiency in terms of administration and patient care; and h) 
Litigation increases inequalities of access to health services.” The Likert scale has four values (Never (1), 
Little (2), Sometimes (3) and Significantly (4). Options d and h served as our efficiency, respectively 
equity thermometers. As a robustness check for our equity measure, we used an additional question 
(number  29  in  the  survey)  phrased  as:  “In  general,  to  what  extent  would  you  say  that  healthcare 
litigation  resulted  in  health  services  that  are  more responsive  to  litigants  compared  to  non-litigant 
users?” This question was accompanied by a    point Likert scale, where   means “there is no difference 
between the two groups” and    “the two groups are very different.”   
Overall, the majority of stakeholders see positive effects of both types of litigation in terms of 
reducing  administrative  efficiencies  related  to  the  design  and  adjustment  of  the  Benefit  Plan. 
Specifically,  on the  equity  dimension,  despite  a  large  standard  deviation  indicating  some  degree of 
uncertainty, 78% of all respondents do not think that judicialization has a distorting impact in terms of 
















In other words, according to respondents’ answers, the litigants are not perceived as being more 
likely than non-litigants to obtain higher access to the healthcare system. To date, we do not have 
evidence  (in  terms  of  stakeholders’  perceptions)  that,  on  average,  health  litigation  poses  equity 
concerns in Uruguay. However, when analyzing equity implications, in addition to consequences of 
access, origins of litigation also become essential. If there is a self-selection effect (i.e. mobilized groups 
with greater financial and legal resources are more likely to litigate than the poor and/or unorganized 
interests), then judicialization of health is likely to have a significant equity effect.  
In  general,  during  interviews,  socio-economic  class  in  Uruguay  is  perceived  as  having  an 
ambiguous effect in terms of increasing the propensity of certain individuals to litigate or not; in the 
quantitative component of the study, 78% of all respondents agreed that low income individuals are not 
likely to initiate litigation; over 60% think that litigation is a middle or upper class act. There is, however, 
an asymmetry of perception: consumer groups/patients see it to a greater extent as a lower-middle 
class empowering phenomenon compared to all other stakeholders.  
Additionally, perception of mobilizational patterns matters when evaluating equity concerns. If 
stakeholders empirically associated mobilizational agents (such as pharmaceutical companies, activist 
patient groups, lawyers, etc.) with individual litigants bringing cases to court, there would be equity 
implications as investments and outcomes would be skewed towards groups with greater resources.   In 
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companies  with  commercial  interests.  It  follows  that  the  general  perception  (some  level  of 
heterogeneity  in  responses  notwithstanding)  in  Uruguay  is  that  healthcare  litigation  does  not  pose 
major equity problems for the time being.  
Unlike in the case of equity, on the efficiency dimension (including on questions referring to the 
overall threat to the financial sustainability of the Benefit Plan caused by potentially rising litigation), 
there is more variation of perceptions among respondents (see histogram below). A simple majority of 
52.17% of stakeholders who responded to our quantitative survey perceive that there is very little effect 
overall. The histogram displayed in Figure 6 below plots the distribution of responses to Question 32 of 
the survey: “Do recursos de amparo in healthcare affect any of the following categories?” Option 4 (“The 
financial sustainability of the system”) is a good additional measure of equity concerns. 





Given  this  brief  background  of  the  baseline  equity  and  efficiency  perceptions  among 
stakeholders, we now turn to specific tests of the hypotheses derived from the substantive literature on 
the impact of health litigation part of the formal model. To recap the major empirical implications, a 
change in the institutional context facilitating or inhibiting judicialization of healthcare from    to 
 will generate predictable reactions from different actors. Generally, an institutional change 
will affect the welfare of a given group depending on how its marginal effect alters the perceived 
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1) The public sector agency, according to the model, is expected to shape its attitude towards litigation 
according to the limits judicialization poses on agency rent extraction and/or policy departures from the 
agency’s bliss point: 

 '  }. 
Questions    and  4 of the survey ask stakeholders to answer: “in general, what are the consequences 
of increasing health litigation” for both types of cases (recursos de amparo, respective malpractice). The 
results are displayed below. 






Figure 7 shows comparatively the negative (1), neutral (2) or positive (3) evaluations by all three 
branches of government (group 1) and civil society (group 0) for both types of litigation (amparos and 
malpractice). The government respondents, overall, see negative consequences for amparo litigation, 
but are more divided on the issue of malpractice cases, as the agencies do not deal with the latter 
category directly. On the other hand, non-state actors are more divided on the issue in general, with a 
slight  propensity  to  evaluate  amparo  effects  as  being  positive.  This  empirical  pattern  confirms  the 
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2) The predictions of our model suggest that unorganized groups will ascribe negative consequences to 

















This set of conditions implies a potentially ambiguous  effect of rising litigation effect on  unorganized 
groups (the net effect will depend on whether th e welfare gain from a reduction in rent -extraction is 
greater or smaller than the welfare gain from the increased power of lobbies). 
If we treat patient/consumer groups as less organized than corporate lobbies, we notice indeed 
a statistically significant difference between consumers, on one hand, and regulators and producers, on 
the other hand, with consumers seeing the effects as being particularly positive (a mean of 3, compared 
to a mean of 1.87 – lower than neutral for the non-consumer group). 
 












In general, lobby groups will have a positive perception of the effects of rising litigation as it reduces 
rent extraction of the public sector agency and allows their indirect influence on adjustments of the 
Benefit Plan.  
One of the problems commonly assoc iated with perception surveys is self -identification of incentives 
and stakes. In other words, lobbies might not publicly state what their true gains following litigation are, 
while having strong private beliefs about their sign and magnitude. Therefore, i n order to correct the 
self-identification bias, we also  include a control   (Perception  of  Lobby  Influence)  that  captures  the 
overall assessment of the intensity with which “members of the private sector with commercial interests 
mobilize or help litigants” (question 13 of the survey). This variable is ordinal and ranges from 1 (never) 
to 5 (continuous mobilization efforts).  34 
 
Here are the empirical findings: 
Table 4: Ordered probit estimation of perceived consequences of rising health litigation 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Litigation effects  Litigation effects  Litigation effects 
Perception of lobby influence 
-0.458**  -0.455**  -0.207 
  (-2.24)  (-2.22)  (-0.83) 
Organized lobbies (producers) 
  -0.342   
    (-0.62)   
Unorganized interests (consumers) 
    1.436* 
      (1.94) 
_cut1 
-1.589**  -1.683**  -0.474 
  (-2.19)  (-2.26)  (-0.50) 
_cut2 
-1.086  -1.173  0.0906 
  (-1.56)  (-1.64)  (0.10) 
N 
24  24  24 
t statistics in parentheses 
     
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
  
 
The results are quite nuanced. On one hand, the conditional effect captured by the model 
(actors’ awareness of litigation causing higher lobby influence) is significant and substantive. The more 
stakeholders  are  aware  (or  perceive)  that  judicialization  makes  the  public  sector  agency  more 
permeable to organized lobby interests, the less positive they evaluate the overall consequences of 
rising litigation.  
We  do  find  some  level  of  confirmation  for  our  unorganized  group  hypothesis:  on  average, 
consumer and civil society groups are more likely to see judicialization as positive even after controlling 
for awareness of lobby influence. With respect to organized producers’ groups, the results are quite 35 
 
ambiguous (the coefficient is not statistically significant and its sign is negative, suggesting that the 
overall evaluation of lobbying groups might diverge from our model’s prediction). According to the self-
defined stakes in rising healthcare litigation, pharmaceutical companies and doctors’ groups in Uruguay 
find litigation to have negative consequences for their organizations, and insurers assess it as being 
neutral.  Whereas  the  doctors’  lobby’s  perceptions  are  expected  given  the  losses  incurred  through 
malpractice cases, the position of the pharmaceutical companies is somewhat unexpected. There are 
several potential explanations: (1) the self-defined stake identification with respect to litigation might 
conceal private preferences of private interests;
45 (2) equity is part of the general policy environment in 
Uruguay, and the market/reputational costs of skewing equity outcomes for pharmaceutical companies 
might be higher than the actual lobbying benefits; and (3) The Uruguay pharmaceutical market, given its 
small size, as well as the close knit community of policymakers, might have idiosyncratic characteristics 
restraining the lobbying behavior of some organized interests. Further case studies of healthcare 
litigation and actors’ preferences can elucidate the empirical puzzle.  
V.  Conclusion 
 
The political economy of public health care provision is characterized by complexity. Issues of efficiency 
and equity ensure that different actors have (partially) conflicting agendas. Thereby, perceptions of the 
welfare effects of the public health care system, as well as proposed changes to its operation, are likely 
to  engender  complex  trade-offs  and  welfare  implications  for  different  stakeholders.  Through  this 
working paper, we sought to contribute to the growing corpus of work in this field, by developing and 
testing the implications of a simple model of the political economy of public health systems. Utilizing the 
insights of the existing literature, as well as modeling frameworks, we were able to generate a model 
from which we could derive a set of generic hypotheses regarding how different actors (stakeholders) 
will perceive the status quo of priority setting in the public health care system, as well as, in conjunction 
with  substantive  assumptions  from  the  governance  literature,  how  such  actors  would  perceive  the 
effects of increasing healthcare judicialization.  
The  generic  model  anticipates  that  public  health  care  agents  will  be  less  concerned  about 
efficiency  in  the  system  vis-à-vis  health  care  consumers-  as  more  efficiency  in  resource  allocation 
diminishes the latter’s ability to extract rents from the public health care system. While public health 
                                                           
45 We tried to address the issue of private versus public beliefs here by including the respondents’ indirect assessments of 
lobbies’ gains from litigation (our control, Perception Lobby Influence). 36 
 
care consumers prefer a more efficient public health care system, they are divided over equity concerns 
Specifically,  more  organized  public  health  care  consumers,  capable  of  more  effectively 
lobbying/litigating, will be less concerned about the equity dimension of health care provision vis-à-vis 
unorganized groups.  
The substantive literature on the impact of health litigation also allows us to generate a set of 
secondary or substantive hypotheses. Specifically, much of this literature suggests that while increased 
health litigation may increase efficiency, it has an adverse effect on equity. 
  Empirically, we first tested the generic implication of the formal model and found confirmation 
of our hypothesis. Non-state actors (health care consumers) are, on average, more concerned with 
efficiency than the public sector agency (health care producers). Secondly, more organized groups are 
more likely than patients or civil society (unorganized groups) to place a lower emphasize on equity 
issues. 
In  terms  of  substantive  implications  of  healthcare  litigation,  we  analyzed  two  types  of 
judicialization related to healthcare: malpractice and recursos de amparo (related to the inclusion of 
high technology medication in the Benefit Plan). Our findings presented in Part 2 of the paper are 
somewhat counterintuitive and challenge the major assumptions of at least some of the substantive 
literature. Overall, awareness of lobby group involvement in litigation related mobilization renders a 
negative perception of stakeholders with respect to the consequences of litigation. Patients and civil 
society (as unorganized groups) perceive litigation as increasing access to the Benefit Plan, therefore 
positive. Organized groups including pharmaceutical companies have an ambiguous position, with a 
negative self-defined perception. This result challenges our theoretical expectations. We speculate on 
some  of  the  potential  explanations  but  are  aware  that  a  comparative  case  study  and  stakeholder 
mapping would help us elucidate the puzzle.    
In our modeling strategy employed in this paper we treat the public sector agency as being 
unified, but we are aware that there is an additional political economic game played between branches 
of government (particularly, the executive and the judiciary) that generates judicialization equilibria in 
healthcare. Further formal and empirical research will hopefully give us greater theoretical leverage for 
addressing these issues. 
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